In multiplayer games, coordination mechanisms like correlated equilibria help players avoid lose-lose outcomes. The proposed reduced rank correlated equilibria method reduces computational complexity by approximating joint actions with pre-computed Nash equilibria. This approach significantly reduces the number of joint actions considered, making it more scalable for large-scale games. The algorithm efficiently computes correlated equilibria based on a novel concept termed RRCE, residing in the convex hull of multiple Nash equilibria. By applying this mechanism to an air traffic queue management problem, significant improvements in fairness and delay cost are observed compared to Nash solutions. The study evaluates various algorithms' performance through numerical experiments involving different numbers of players and actions.
إلى لغة أخرى
من محتوى المصدر
arxiv.org
الرؤى الأساسية المستخلصة من
by Jaehan Im,Yu... في arxiv.org 03-18-2024
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2403.10384.pdfاستفسارات أعمق