The paper presents a comprehensive analysis of existing solutions for Verifiable Privacy-Preserving Computations (VPPCs), which aim to provide both input privacy and public verifiability of the computation results. The authors classify the VPPC schemes into four main classes based on the underlying privacy-preserving computation technique: MPC-based, HE-based, DLT-based, and DP-based.
For each class, the authors discuss the different approaches used to achieve verifiability, such as non-succinct zero-knowledge proofs (ZKPs), succinct ZKPs, homomorphic MACs, and trusted execution environments. They analyze the security, privacy, and public verifiability properties of the schemes, as well as their efficiency and practical aspects.
The key insights from the analysis include:
The authors also identify several underexposed topics, such as the need for input data authentication, reusability of intermediate results, and post-quantum security, which are important for the practical adoption of VPPC schemes.
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by Tariq Bontek... às arxiv.org 04-17-2024
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2309.08248.pdfPerguntas Mais Profundas