
This paper explores the design of computationally efficient procurement auctions that maximize social welfare when an auctioneer seeks to acquire services from strategic sellers, leveraging submodular optimization algorithms to create mechanisms that are incentive-compatible, individually rational, and guarantee non-negative surplus for the auctioneer.


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procurement-auctions-for-submodular-value-functions-designing-efficient-and-incentive-compatible-mechanisms


Procurement Auctions for Submodular Value Functions: Designing Efficient and Incentive-Compatible Mechanisms


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When procurement involves both winner-pay production costs and all-pay investment costs, optimal mechanisms may involve a degree of favoritism, balancing ex-post efficiency with the minimization of duplicated investment costs.


optimal-procurement-design-with-scoring-and-favoritism-balancing-efficiency-and-investment-costs


Optimal Procurement Design with Scoring and Favoritism: Balancing Efficiency and Investment Costs
