The article addresses the challenges of sybil votes and partial participation in voting procedures, which can undermine the ability of voting to truly reflect the will of the society.
The authors build upon the framework of Reality-Aware Social Choice, using the status-quo as an ever-present distinguished alternative. They introduce the concepts of safety and liveness to characterize the resilience of voting rules in the presence of sybils and abstentions.
The authors first analyze the simplest setting with two alternatives, the status-quo and a proposal. They define the Status-Quo Enforcing mechanism, which adds virtual votes in support of the status-quo, and show that it often achieves the optimal tradeoff between safety and liveness.
The authors then generalize their results to more complex social choice settings, including multiple alternatives, multiple referenda, and single-peaked domains. They also consider an approximate notion of safety, where the outcome may not be the preferred alternative of the honest voters, but is not too far from it.
Finally, the authors relax the assumption that the identity of absentees is adversarial, and show that this leads to an improved safety-liveness tradeoff. They also consider the case where inactive voters can delegate their vote, which can eliminate the dependency on the turnout.
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