Yang, Y.-T., Li, T., & Zhu, Q. (2024). Transparent Tagging for Strategic Social Nudges on User-Generated Misinformation. arXiv preprint arXiv:2411.00825v1.
This paper investigates the optimal tagging policy for social network platforms (SNPs) to minimize the spread of misinformation, considering the strategic interactions between the platform, content providers, and users, as well as the potential for misdetection errors.
The authors develop a three-player Bayesian persuasion game model, where the SNP designs a tagging policy, content providers choose their effort level in generating authentic content, and users decide whether to leave positive or negative comments based on the tag and their beliefs. The spread of misinformation is modeled using a multi-type branching process.
Transparent tagging leverages social nudges to combat misinformation by influencing user perceptions and indirectly incentivizing content providers to prioritize authenticity. This approach proves most effective even considering the realistic challenge of misdetection errors.
This research provides a theoretical foundation for designing effective misinformation mitigation strategies on SNPs by highlighting the power of transparency and social nudges in shaping content generation and consumption patterns.
The model assumes homogeneous users with identical utilities. Future research could explore the impact of diverse user behaviors and preferences on the effectiveness of transparent tagging. Additionally, investigating the role of platform credibility and user trust in the context of misdetection errors would be valuable.
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by Ya-Ting Yang... at arxiv.org 11-05-2024
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