Core Concepts
A defensive function can be used to enforce the concealment of secret events in a discrete event system with partial observation, even when the system is unconcealable without the defensive function.
Abstract
The content discusses the problem of event concealment and concealability enforcement in discrete event systems (DESs) modeled as non-deterministic finite automata under partial observation.
Key highlights:
The authors introduce the notion of event concealment, where certain events are deemed secret and the goal is to hide their occurrences from an external eavesdropper.
They define concealability, which characterizes the ability of the system to hide the occurrences of secret events, and provide a necessary and sufficient condition for concealability based on a diagnoser construction.
When the system is unconcealable, the authors propose a defensive function that can be placed at the interface of the system with the eavesdropper to manipulate the observations generated by the system through event deletions, insertions, or replacements.
The authors define the notion of C-enforceability, which captures the ability of the defensive function to conceal the occurrences of secret events perpetually, regardless of the system's activity.
They provide a polynomial complexity construction to obtain one necessary and one sufficient condition for C-enforceability, and show how the sufficient condition can be used to derive a strategy for the defensive function to enforce concealability.