Core Concepts
Restricting entries in all-pay contests can lead to non-monotonic equilibrium efforts, with admitting all players being optimal.
Abstract
In the study of all-pay contests, restricting entries is common to enhance competitiveness or due to resource constraints. The impact of entry restrictions on players' efforts is complex. Players admitted into the contest update their beliefs based on signals about their abilities. Posterior beliefs are correlated and depend on private abilities, leading to a unique equilibrium strategy. Surprisingly, efforts are not always monotone with the number of admitted players. Admitting all players maximizes equilibrium efforts under various conditions. The study extends to a two-stage contest model where first-stage efforts influence second-stage beliefs and efforts.
Stats
Despite IID priors, posterior beliefs are correlated.
Equilibrium effort not always monotone with number of admitted players.
Optimal strategy is admitting all players for maximizing equilibrium efforts.