Core Concepts
The core message of this paper is to introduce a convexification technique that allows for the characterization of equilibria in generalized Nash equilibrium problems (GNEPs) with non-convex strategy spaces and non-convex cost functions, including the important case of games with mixed-integer variables.
Abstract
The paper presents a new approach to characterize equilibria in generalized Nash equilibrium problems (GNEPs) with non-convex strategy spaces and non-convex cost functions, including the case of games with mixed-integer variables. The key idea is to reformulate the original non-convex GNEP via a convexification technique using the Nikaido-Isoda function.
The main contributions are:
The authors introduce the concept of convexified instances Iconv for any given instance I of the GNEP. They show that a feasible strategy profile is an equilibrium for the original instance I if and only if it is an equilibrium for any convexified instance Iconv and the convexified cost functions coincide with the initial ones.
The authors develop this convexification approach along three dimensions:
For quasi-linear models, where the convexified instance has a linear cost function and a polyhedral strategy space for each player, the convexification reduces the GNEP to a standard (non-linear) optimization problem.
The authors derive two complete characterizations of those GNEPs for which the convexification leads to a jointly constrained or a jointly convex GNEP, respectively.
The authors demonstrate the applicability of their results by presenting a numerical study regarding the computation of equilibria for three classes of GNEPs related to integral network flows and discrete market equilibria.