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Revealed Preference Analysis of Information Acquisition Costs Based on Posterior Means


Core Concepts
This paper provides testable conditions, based on revealed preference analysis, to identify whether the cost of acquiring information depends solely on posterior means, a simplifying assumption often used in applied work.
Abstract
  • Bibliographic Information: Mensch, J., & Malik, K. (2024). Posterior-Mean Separable Costs of Information Acquisition. arXiv preprint arXiv:2311.09496v4.

  • Research Objective: This paper aims to develop a revealed-preference approach to determine when the choices of a decision-maker (DM) can be represented as arising from a cost of information acquisition that depends only on posterior means.

  • Methodology: The authors utilize a theoretical framework building on previous work by Caplin and Dean (2015) and Denti (2022), who also use a revealed preference approach to represent information costs. They introduce a new axiom, "No Improving Posterior-Mean Cycles" (NIPMC), which is a strengthening of Denti's "No Improving Posterior Cycles" (NIPC) axiom. This new axiom accounts for the binding mean-preserving contraction constraint when comparing reallocations of posterior means.

  • Key Findings: The paper demonstrates that if a dataset satisfies the axioms of "No Improving Action Switches" (NIAS) and NIPMC, it can be represented as coming from a DM with posterior-mean separable costs of information. This implies that the cost of information acquisition can be represented as a function of the difference between the prior mean and the distribution of posterior means.

  • Main Conclusions: The characterization of information acquisition costs as posterior-mean separable has significant implications for applied work. It allows for the use of information design techniques to solve the DM's problem, simplifying the analysis and enabling the use of tools from convex analysis.

  • Significance: This research contributes to the literature on the representation of costly information acquisition by providing theoretical foundations for posterior-mean separable information costs. This class of cost functions is particularly relevant for economic problems where payoffs depend only on posterior means, such as financial markets and auctions.

  • Limitations and Future Research: The paper primarily focuses on the theoretical foundations of posterior-mean separable costs. Future research could explore empirical applications of the proposed framework, testing its validity in real-world settings and examining its predictive power in explaining decision-making behavior. Additionally, extending the analysis to incorporate dynamic information acquisition processes and learning could provide further insights.

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by Jeffrey Mens... at arxiv.org 11-06-2024

https://arxiv.org/pdf/2311.09496.pdf
Posterior-Mean Separable Costs of Information Acquisition

Deeper Inquiries

How can the proposed framework be applied to analyze information acquisition costs in specific economic contexts, such as consumer choice or firm investment decisions?

The proposed framework, centered around posterior-mean separable costs of information acquisition, offers a tractable and insightful approach to analyzing information costs in various economic contexts. Here's how it can be applied to consumer choice and firm investment decisions: Consumer Choice: Product Choice with Uncertain Quality: Consider consumers choosing among products with varying quality levels, where quality is the unknown state. Consumers can acquire information about product quality through reviews, trials, or expert opinions. The framework allows us to model the cost of acquiring this information as a function of the reduction in uncertainty about the average quality. For example, a consumer might be willing to invest more effort (incur higher cost) to differentiate between products with a wider range of potential quality levels. Price Search: Consumers often face uncertainty about the prices offered by different sellers for a particular product. They can gather information by visiting stores, browsing online, or asking friends. The framework allows us to model the cost of this price search as a function of the expected reduction in price uncertainty. A consumer might be willing to search more extensively when the potential price savings are larger, justifying a higher information cost. Firm Investment Decisions: Investment Under Market Uncertainty: Firms frequently make investment decisions facing uncertainty about future market conditions, such as demand, competition, or regulations. They can acquire information through market research, pilot projects, or expert consultations. The framework allows us to model the cost of this information acquisition as a function of the reduction in uncertainty about the average market outcome. For example, a firm might invest more in market research when entering a new and unfamiliar market with a wider range of potential outcomes. R&D and Innovation: Firms invest in R&D facing uncertainty about the success of their innovation efforts. They can acquire information through experiments, prototypes, or patent analysis. The framework allows us to model the cost of this information acquisition as a function of the reduction in uncertainty about the average success rate or profitability of the innovation. A firm might be willing to invest more in information gathering for riskier R&D projects with a wider range of potential outcomes. Key Considerations for Applications: Empirical Estimation: The framework provides testable implications through the NIAS (No Improving Action Switches) and NIPMC (No Improving Posterior Mean Cycles) axioms. By analyzing observed choices, researchers can test for the consistency of the data with posterior-mean separable information costs and potentially estimate the cost function. Information Design: The framework connects to the literature on information design, allowing for the analysis of how firms or policymakers can strategically design information disclosure mechanisms to influence consumer or firm behavior, taking into account their information acquisition costs.

Could there be alternative behavioral explanations, beyond posterior-mean separable costs, that could also rationalize the observed choice data?

While the proposed framework offers a compelling explanation for choice data consistent with posterior-mean separable costs, alternative behavioral explanations might also rationalize the observed patterns. Here are a few possibilities: Non-Linear Cost Functions: The framework assumes a specific functional form for information costs – separability and dependence on posterior means. Alternative models could explore non-linear cost functions or dependencies on other features of the posterior distribution, such as variance, entropy, or specific quantiles. For example, a consumer might face increasing marginal costs of information acquisition, leading to a convex cost function. Subjective Beliefs and Updating: The framework assumes that the decision-maker and the analyst share the same prior beliefs and update their beliefs rationally according to Bayes' rule. However, individuals might have biased beliefs or employ non-Bayesian updating rules, leading to different information acquisition patterns. For example, confirmation bias could lead individuals to seek information that confirms their existing beliefs, even if it's not the most informative. Heuristics and Bounded Rationality: Instead of explicitly optimizing information acquisition, individuals might rely on simpler heuristics or rules of thumb due to cognitive limitations or time constraints. These heuristics might lead to choices that appear consistent with posterior-mean separable costs, even if the underlying decision-making process is different. For example, a consumer might use a "satisficing" heuristic, stopping their information search once they find a product that meets a minimum quality threshold. Context-Dependent Costs: The framework assumes that information costs are independent of the specific decision problem. However, the context of the decision, such as the importance of the decision or the available time, might influence the perceived cost of information acquisition. For example, a consumer might be willing to invest more effort in information gathering for a high-stakes purchase compared to a routine purchase. Distinguishing Between Explanations: Experimental Design: Carefully designed experiments can help disentangle these alternative explanations by manipulating factors like the cost of information, the complexity of the decision problem, or the availability of heuristics. Process Data: Collecting process data, such as eye-tracking or clickstream data, can provide insights into the actual information search and decision-making process, going beyond choices alone.

How does the concept of information cost relate to broader notions of cognitive effort and bounded rationality in decision-making?

The concept of information cost is closely intertwined with the broader notions of cognitive effort and bounded rationality in decision-making. Information Cost as Cognitive Effort: Acquiring and processing information requires cognitive resources, such as attention, memory, and computational capacity. Information cost can be viewed as a proxy for the cognitive effort exerted by individuals when making decisions under uncertainty. The higher the cost of information, the more cognitively demanding the decision-making process becomes. Bounded Rationality and Information Constraints: The concept of bounded rationality recognizes that individuals have limited cognitive resources and face time constraints, leading them to deviate from perfectly rational decision-making. Information cost is one crucial aspect of these limitations. Due to the cost of acquiring and processing information, individuals often make decisions based on incomplete or imperfect information, leading to boundedly rational choices. Heuristics and Simplification: To cope with cognitive limitations and information costs, individuals often rely on heuristics or mental shortcuts to simplify decision-making. These heuristics can be viewed as strategies for reducing cognitive effort by focusing on a subset of available information or using simpler decision rules. Examples of the Interplay: Information Overload: When faced with an overwhelming amount of information, the cognitive effort required to process it all becomes prohibitively high. This can lead to information overload, where individuals make poorer decisions or avoid making decisions altogether. Attention Allocation: Individuals have limited attention spans and must allocate their attention strategically among competing demands. Information cost influences this allocation, as individuals are more likely to pay attention to information that is perceived as more valuable or less costly to acquire. Choice Architecture and Nudges: Recognizing the role of information cost and cognitive effort, policymakers and businesses can design choice environments (choice architecture) that nudge individuals towards making better decisions. For example, presenting information in a clear and concise manner can reduce cognitive effort and facilitate informed choices. Key Takeaway: The concept of information cost provides a valuable lens for understanding how cognitive limitations and bounded rationality shape decision-making under uncertainty. By explicitly considering the costs associated with information acquisition and processing, we can gain a more realistic and nuanced understanding of how individuals make choices in complex environments.
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