Core Concepts
This paper presents a game-theoretic framework called Red Teaming Game (RTG) for analyzing and optimizing the security of language models through multi-turn offensive-defensive interactions between Red Team Language Models (RLMs) and Blue Team Language Model (BLM). The authors propose an automated solver called Gamified Red Teaming Solver (GRTS) that can discover diverse attack strategies and effectively improve the security of language models.
Abstract
The paper introduces a game-theoretic framework called Red Teaming Game (RTG) to model the multi-turn dialogue interactions between Red Team Language Models (RLMs) and Blue Team Language Model (BLM). RTG consists of two levels: a token-level Markov Decision Process for Token Generation (MDPTG) and a sentence-level Extensive-form Team Game in Dialogue (ETGD).
The authors propose an automated solver called Gamified Red Teaming Solver (GRTS) to solve RTG. GRTS iteratively expands the policy sets of RLMs and BLM, computes a restricted Nash equilibrium, and adds new best response policies to the policy sets. This process continues until an approximate Nash equilibrium is reached, which provides the optimization directions for both RLMs and BLM.
The experiments demonstrate that GRTS can autonomously discover diverse attack strategies and effectively improve the security of language models. Key insights include:
GRTS reduces the exploitability of the joint strategies of RLMs and BLM, indicating convergence towards Nash equilibrium.
Multi-turn attack-defense interactions help reduce the alignment tax on BLM while improving the aggressiveness of RLMs and the safety of BLMs.
GRTS uncovers a wide range of attack topics and forms, exposing various security vulnerabilities in BLM.
The attack success rate of RLMs decreases as the number of attack rounds increases, but RLMs can also identify new vulnerabilities in later rounds.
Overall, the paper establishes a foundational game-theoretic framework for red teaming language models and provides a new scalable oversight technique for language model alignment.
Stats
"LLMs such as ChatGPT (John Schulman & Hilton, 2022) and Claude (Anthropic, 2023) have demonstrated the ability to generate high-quality content and follow human instructions, spawning applications to assist humans in solving various problems."
"However, this scientific advancement has also given rise to significant ethical and safety concerns. For example, language models that absorb vast and unfiltered data from diverse sources but without alignment can inadvertently generate content with undesirable features (Gehman et al., 2020) such as pornography, violence, racial discrimination, gender bias and other harmful biases, distorting the correct societal values (Sap et al., 2019; Hutchinson et al., 2020; Kurita et al., 2019; Abid et al., 2021; Basta et al., 2019)."
"Furthermore, the misuse of these models can lead to their involvement in criminal activities, providing guidance and support for privacy breaches (Carlini et al., 2021), the creation of hazardous substances, and other harmful behaviors (Bender et al., 2021; Bommasani et al., 2021; Dinan et al., 2021; Weidinger et al., 2021; Ganguli et al., 2022a; Tamkin et al., 2021), thereby increasing the potential for societal crime rates."
Quotes
"Deployable Large Language Models (LLMs) must conform to the criterion of helpfulness and harmlessness, thereby achieving consistency between LLMs outputs and human values."
"Existing work rely solely on manual red team designs and heuristic adversarial prompts for vulnerability detection and optimization. These approaches lack rigorous mathematical formulation, thus limiting the exploration of diverse attack strategy within quantifiable measure and optimization of LLMs under convergence guarantees."
"To detect toxic content within language models, existing approaches predominantly rely on heuristic design of adversarial prompts through manual annotation to uncover security vulnerabilities (Xu et al., 2021; Ross et al., 2021)."