This research paper investigates the vulnerability of Judge LLMs, specifically their susceptibility to token segmentation bias, and introduces the Emoji Attack as a method to exploit this weakness.
Bibliographic Information: Wei, Z., Liu, Y., Erichson, N. B. (2024). Emoji Attack: A Method for Misleading Judge LLMs in Safety Risk Detection. arXiv preprint arXiv:2411.01077v1.
Research Objective: The study aims to analyze the impact of token segmentation bias on Judge LLMs' ability to detect harmful content and demonstrate the effectiveness of the Emoji Attack in exploiting this bias.
Methodology: The researchers analyze the performance of various state-of-the-art Judge LLMs, including Llama Guard, Llama Guard 2, ShieldLM, WildGuard, GPT-3.5, and GPT-4, when presented with harmful responses containing manipulated token segmentation through space insertion and the Emoji Attack. They evaluate the "unsafe" prediction ratio, representing the proportion of harmful responses correctly identified.
Key Findings: The study reveals that all tested Judge LLMs exhibit a significant decrease in their "unsafe" prediction ratio when faced with token segmentation bias, indicating their vulnerability to this type of manipulation. The Emoji Attack, which strategically inserts emojis within tokens, further reduces the "unsafe" prediction ratio, demonstrating its effectiveness in bypassing safety measures.
Main Conclusions: The research concludes that Judge LLMs are susceptible to token segmentation bias, highlighting a critical vulnerability in LLM safety mechanisms. The Emoji Attack effectively exploits this bias, raising concerns about the reliability of current Judge LLMs in preventing harmful outputs.
Significance: This research significantly contributes to the field of LLM safety by exposing a critical vulnerability and proposing a novel attack method. It emphasizes the need for more robust Judge LLMs and defense strategies to mitigate the risks associated with token segmentation bias.
Limitations and Future Research: The study primarily focuses on emoji insertion as an attack vector. Future research could explore the impact of other delimiters and develop more sophisticated defense mechanisms to counter token segmentation bias-based attacks.
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by Zhipeng Wei,... at arxiv.org 11-05-2024
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2411.01077.pdfDeeper Inquiries