The study focuses on single-sample prophet inequalities (SSPIs) using a novel greedy approach to improve competitive guarantees. The algorithm directly derives SSPIs for matchings, matroids, and combinatorial auctions, offering significant advancements in the field of prophet and secretary problems. By avoiding lossy reductions to order-oblivious secretary algorithms, the research provides versatile techniques for designing SSPIs. The results extend to scenarios like general matching with edge arrivals, bipartite matching with vertex arrivals, and budget additive combinatorial auctions. Mechanism design variants are also considered alongside an analysis of SSPI approaches' power and limitations compared to OOS methods.
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arxiv.org
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by Cons... om arxiv.org 03-19-2024
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2111.03174.pdfDiepere vragen