The paper proposes Magmaw, a novel wireless attack framework that can generate universal adversarial perturbations (UAPs) to subvert machine learning (ML)-based multimodal wireless communication systems. Magmaw addresses several key challenges:
Modality-agnostic: Magmaw can generate perturbations that are effective against multimodal data (e.g., image, video, speech, text) transmitted over the wireless channel, without prior knowledge of the modality.
Protocol-agnostic: Magmaw can craft perturbations that are robust to various physical layer protocols (e.g., modulation, coding rate, OFDM) used by the ML-based wireless system, without knowing the specific protocol details.
Synchronization-free: Magmaw can generate perturbations that remain effective even with time and frequency offsets between the adversarial device and the legitimate transmitter/receiver.
Defense-resilient: Magmaw can produce diverse and robust perturbations that are resilient to adaptive defenses, such as perturbation detectors.
Magmaw adopts an ensemble learning approach, training a Perturbation Generator Model (PGM) on a set of surrogate multimodal joint source-channel coding (JSCC) models. The PGM learns to generate UAPs that can effectively subvert the target JSCC models and downstream applications, even in the presence of strong defense mechanisms.
The paper evaluates Magmaw's performance through extensive experiments, including a real-time wireless attack platform using software-defined radios. The results demonstrate that Magmaw can significantly degrade the quality of received signals and disrupt downstream tasks, such as video classification and audio-visual event recognition, with high success rates.
Til et annet språk
fra kildeinnhold
arxiv.org
Viktige innsikter hentet fra
by Jung-Woo Cha... klokken arxiv.org 09-20-2024
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2311.00207.pdfDypere Spørsmål