The paper provides an overview of the RPL routing protocol and the Hatchetman attack, which exploits the non-storing mode of RPL to modify the source routing header and prevent packets from reaching their intended destination.
The authors implement the Hatchetman attack in the Contiki operating system and COOJA simulator, and analyze its impact on performance metrics such as downward packet delivery ratio, average end-to-end delay, and overhead packets.
To mitigate the attack, the authors propose a game theoretic approach where each node maintains a payoff matrix based on whether it can forward the packet or not. By identifying the dominant strategy, the approach can detect the attacker node and add it to a blacklist. The proposed solution is lightweight and does not rely on cryptographic techniques or MAC-based solutions.
The simulation results demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed approach in detecting the Hatchetman attack and maintaining network performance.
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by Girish Sharm... klokken arxiv.org 04-03-2024
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2404.01689.pdfDypere Spørsmål