The paper presents ProLoc, a new location proof service (LPS) that addresses the requirements of citizen journalism and similar scenarios. Key insights:
ProLoc can provide a feasible region for a device's location at a given time, even if the device did not encounter other devices precisely at that time. It does this by extrapolating from the device's closest confirmed locations and the maximum distance it could have traveled.
ProLoc includes a novel defense against retroactive collusion attacks involving large numbers of fictitious devices. It uses a variant of the TrustRank algorithm to identify suspicious devices based on their connectivity patterns, and limits the impact of such devices on the location proofs.
The paper first describes ProLoc's algorithm for generating location proofs in hindsight, and then details its defense against collusion attacks. It also presents an experimental evaluation using a simulated dataset and a real-world dataset of Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) contacts.
The key findings are:
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arxiv.org
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