Conceitos essenciais
The author explores the complexity of fair allocation under ternary valuations, showing APX-hardness for maximizing Nash welfare and egalitarian welfare.
Resumo
The content delves into the intricacies of fair allocation problems under ternary valuations. It discusses the challenges in computing exact fair allocations and presents results on maximizing Nash welfare and egalitarian welfare. The analysis involves detailed proofs and reductions from graph theory problems to establish the computational complexity of these allocation scenarios.
Estatísticas
We show that for any distinct non-negative a, b, and c, maximizing Nash welfare is APX-hard — i.e., the problem does not admit a PTAS unless P = NP.
We also show that for any distinct a, b, and c, maximizing egalitarian welfare is APX-hard except for a few cases when b = 0 that admit efficient algorithms.
These results make significant progress towards completely characterizing the complexity of computing exact MNW allocations and MEW allocations.
When agents have {a, b, c}-valuations with 0 ≤ a < b < c and 2b < c, computing an MNW allocation is APX-hard.
Assume agents have {0, 1, 3}-valuations. It is impossible to approximate MNW by a factor smaller than 1.00013 unless P = NP.
Citações
"We study the problem of fair allocation of indivisible items when agents have ternary additive valuations."
"Our objective is to find an allocation of items to agents satisfying certain natural justice criteria."
"These results make significant progress towards completely characterizing the complexity of computing exact MNW allocations."