The paper discusses a critical supply-chain attack that was discovered in the XZ Utils library, a widely used open-source data compression tool. The attack involves a backdoor that allows an attacker to execute malicious code remotely on vulnerable systems with root privileges.
The attack path is described in detail, consisting of the following stages:
Building Trust: The attacker, using the pseudonym "Jia Tan", gradually gained trust within the XZ Utils project by contributing code improvements over several years.
Preparation: The attacker obtained commit permissions for the XZ Utils repository and disabled security checks in the Google OSS-Fuzz project, which was used to test the library.
Injecting Backdoor: The attacker added malicious test files to the XZ Utils project, containing the backdoor code.
Deployment: The attacker released a new version of XZ Utils with the backdoor, and convinced Linux distributions to include the malicious version in their package repositories.
Exploitation: The backdoor allows the attacker to execute arbitrary commands on vulnerable SSH servers by modifying a function pointer used by the OpenSSH library.
The paper then discusses various potential mitigation techniques, including organizational security measures for open-source projects, user credibility verification, transparency logs, chain of custody, code sandboxing, and legal defenses.
Para outro idioma
do conteúdo fonte
arxiv.org
Principais Insights Extraídos De
by Mari... às arxiv.org 04-16-2024
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2404.08987.pdfPerguntas Mais Profundas