核心概念
The traditional definition of common knowledge is too restrictive, as it requires simultaneity in dynamic settings. This paper proposes a new, more permissive definition of common knowledge that overcomes the Halpern-Moses Paradox, allowing common knowledge to arise without simultaneity, particularly in canonical examples exhibiting this paradox.
摘要
The paper addresses the Halpern-Moses Paradox, which shows that in dynamic settings with timing frictions, common knowledge cannot arise due to the requirement of simultaneity in the traditional definition. The authors propose a new definition of common knowledge that is more permissive and can overcome this paradox.
Key highlights:
- The traditional definition of common knowledge requires a strong form of mutuality between the epistemic states of players, which implies that common knowledge must become known simultaneously by all players.
- The authors introduce a new definition of common knowledge that reasons about each player's knowledge as a certain local event occurs, rather than requiring simultaneity. This allows common knowledge to arise in the absence of simultaneity.
- The authors provide an Induction Rule that can be used to establish when common knowledge holds under their new definition.
- They demonstrate the usefulness of their definition by deriving an agreement theorem, showing it arises in the Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1982) setting with timing frictions, and applying it to characterize equilibrium behavior in a dynamic coordination game.