核心概念
PSVC vulnerability allows data extraction without device modification, demonstrated through end-to-end attacks on microcontrollers.
摘要
The content discusses a novel side-channel vulnerability, PSVC, that leaks data-dependent power variations. It introduces a methodology to evaluate PSVC vulnerability through case studies. The experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of PSVC attacks on different hardware configurations and varying adversary capabilities. The results highlight the potential for information leakage without device modification.
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Introduction
- Side-channel attacks exploit non-functional behaviors for information extraction.
- Traditional methods require physical access or modifications to devices.
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Physical Side-Channel Evaluation
- Design-time techniques aim to detect power side-channel leaky designs early.
- Run-time methods analyze power, current, or path delay variations for information leakage.
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Research Contributions
- Introduces PSVC vulnerability for launching various attacks.
- Proposes techniques to isolate and evaluate PSVC signature.
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Experiments
- Case studies demonstrate end-to-end attacks exploiting PSVC vulnerability.
- Results show successful key recovery attacks using PSVC.
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Effect of Supply Voltage Range on PSVC Attack
- Experiment explores the impact of supply voltage range on attack success rate.
- Lower input voltages result in reduced signal-to-noise ratio and increased attack resilience.
統計資料
攻撃を行うための入力電圧範囲の影響について調査しました。
低い入力電圧では信号対雑音比が低下し、攻撃への耐性が向上します。
引述
PSVC脆弱性は、デバイスの変更なしでデータ抽出を可能にします。 (PSVC vulnerability allows data extraction without device modification)