The paper considers a many-to-one matching market where ties in the preferences of agents are allowed. The agents' preferences are subject to matroid constraints, which generalize capacity constraints.
The key results are:
These results generalize the findings of Bonifacio, Juarez, Neme, and Oviedo (2024) from the setting with capacity constraints to the more general matroid constraints.
The proofs rely on properties of matroids, such as the existence of fundamental circuits and the ability to exchange elements between bases. The paper also provides algorithmic implications, noting that under the assumption of having independence oracles for the matroids, the existence of strongly stable and super-stable matchings can be determined in polynomial time.
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by Naoyuki Kami... lúc arxiv.org 05-02-2024
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2405.00342.pdfYêu cầu sâu hơn