Universal Neural-Cracking-Machines: Self-Configurable Password Models from Auxiliary Data

核心概念

Introducing Universal Neural-Cracking-Machines, a password model that adapts its guessing strategy based on auxiliary data without accessing plaintext passwords.

摘要

The article introduces the concept of a "universal" password model that can adapt its guessing strategy based on auxiliary data without needing plaintext passwords. It uses deep learning to correlate users' auxiliary information with their passwords, creating tailored models for target systems. The model aims to democratize well-calibrated password models and address challenges in deploying password security solutions at scale. Password strength is not universal, and different communities have varying password distributions. Existing password models are trained at the password level, but a UNCM is trained at the password-leak level using credential databases.

统计

The cleaned leak collection from Cit0day contains 11,922 leaks with 120,521,803 compromised accounts.
The configuration seed ψ has a dimensionality of 756.
The mixing encoder uses an attention mechanism to mix outputs produced by sub-encoders.
The seeded password model fΘ|ψ initializes LSTM states with transformations based on the configuration seed ψ.

引用

"The main intuition is that human-chosen passwords and personally identifiable information are naturally correlated."
"Our framework enables the democratization of well-calibrated password models to the community."

从中提取的关键见解

Universal Neural-Cracking-Machines

by Dario Pasqui... 在 arxiv.org 03-14-2024

https://arxiv.org/pdf/2301.07628.pdf

更深入的查询

How can UNCMs improve cybersecurity beyond traditional methods?

UNCMs offer a novel approach to password modeling by leveraging auxiliary data, such as email addresses, to predict underlying password distributions without needing access to plaintext passwords. This innovative technique allows for the automatic adaptation of guessing strategies based on the target system, enhancing the accuracy and efficiency of password models. By democratizing well-calibrated password models and enabling end-users to generate tailored models autonomously, UNCMs address a major challenge in deploying password security solutions at scale. Additionally, the differential privacy version of UNCMs provides formal guarantees that no meaningful information about individuals providing auxiliary data is leaked upon model publication.

What potential drawbacks or limitations might arise from using UNCMs?

While UNCMs offer significant advantages in improving password security, there are potential drawbacks and limitations to consider. One limitation is the reliance on auxiliary data for training and configuration, which may not always be available or comprehensive enough to accurately represent all user behaviors. Additionally, there could be concerns regarding the privacy implications of using personal information as a proxy signal for predicting passwords. Ensuring that proper safeguards are in place to protect user data and maintain confidentiality is crucial when deploying tailored password models generated by UNCMs.

How could leveraging auxiliary data impact privacy concerns in deploying tailored password models?

Leveraging auxiliary data in deploying tailored password models through techniques like UNCMs can have both positive and negative impacts on privacy concerns. On one hand, using auxiliary data instead of plaintext passwords can help preserve user privacy by not directly exposing sensitive information during model training or inference. However, there is a risk that utilizing personal information for prediction purposes could raise ethical questions about consent and transparency regarding how user data is being used. Implementing differential privacy measures within UNCM frameworks can mitigate some of these concerns by providing formal guarantees that protect individual privacy while still allowing for accurate model generation based on aggregated patterns within the dataset.