Costly Bayesian Persuasion with a Partially Informed Sender: How the Cost of Information Affects Persuasion
In Bayesian persuasion scenarios where information acquisition is costly, the sender's ability to persuade is contingent on the relative costs of acquiring positive versus negative information.
Feasible Joint Posterior Belief Distributions in Multi-Receiver Bayesian Persuasion
In multi-receiver Bayesian persuasion, while characterizing feasible joint belief distributions unconditionally is complex, conditioning on the state reveals a simple structure: feasibility constraints apply only to individual receivers' marginals across states, allowing arbitrary correlation within a state. This insight leads to a novel primal-dual approach for solving persuasion problems, leveraging optimal transport theory and offering tractable solutions for specific classes of problems.
커뮤니케이션에서 약속과 무작위성의 가치: 언제 약속이 발신자에게 유익한가?
유한한 행동과 상태를 가진 커뮤니케이션 게임에서 발신자에게 약속이 가치 있는 경우는 발신자가 무작위 전략을 선호하는 경우뿐이며, 이는 베이지안 설득 문제에서 부분적 실험이 아닌 무작위 실험이 최적일 때 발생한다.
Markov Persuasion Processes: Learning to Persuade from Scratch
Bayesian persuasion studies strategic information disclosure to influence behavior.
Markov Persuasion Processes: Learning to Persuade from Scratch
The authors introduce Markov persuasion processes (MPPs) to address sequential scenarios where a sender interacts with myopic receivers in an unknown environment. They propose an algorithm that optimizes regret and violation trade-offs in learning without knowledge of receiver rewards.
