Optimal Incentive Design for Teams with Interdependent Productivity
Optimal incentive contracts for teams must account for how individual effort affects not only overall output but also the incentives and productivity of other team members.
Truthful Incentive Design in Two-Stage Contracts with Non-Myopic Agents
In two-stage contracts with non-myopic agents, achieving truthful play from the agent requires careful consideration of information asymmetry; while constant second-stage incentives are necessary for continuous type spaces, discrete type spaces allow for non-trivial truthful mechanisms, and introducing an adjustment mechanism can further enhance flexibility in incentive design.
Optimal Contract Design for Information Acquisition with Limited Liability and Budget
Cutoff transfers, which provide a fixed reward only when the agent's report is sufficiently accurate, are optimal for incentivizing information acquisition across a wide range of settings, particularly when the signal distribution exhibits increasing elasticity above one.
New Perspectives in Online Contract Design: Heterogeneous, Homogeneous, Non-Myopic Agents and Team Production
This work explores online contract design from various perspectives, including heterogeneous and homogeneous agents, non-myopic behavior, and team production models.
