Conceitos Básicos
The authors analyze three auction mechanisms for the knapsack problem with private information, finding that the uniform-price auction is most efficient and truthful. Experimental and AI simulations support these findings.
Resumo
The study explores three auction mechanisms for the knapsack problem with private information: discriminatory price, generalized second-price, and uniform-price auctions. Results show that the uniform-price auction is the most efficient and truthful. Experimental data and AI simulations confirm these conclusions. The study sheds light on strategic bidding behavior in complex decision-making scenarios.
Key Points:
- Knapsack auctions involve allocating objects with private values into a fixed-size knapsack.
- Three auction mechanisms were analyzed: discriminatory price, generalized second-price, and uniform-price auctions.
- The uniform-price auction was found to be the most efficient and truthful.
- Experimental results and AI simulations supported the efficiency of the uniform-price auction.
- Strategic bidding behavior was explored through learning algorithms in simulated environments.
Estatísticas
In many real-world situations, however, objects are owned by different people and values are private information.
Using a Greedy algorithm for allocating objects, we analyze bidding behavior, revenue, and efficiency of these three auctions using theory, lab experiments, and AI-enriched simulations.
Our results suggest that the uniform-price auction has the highest level of truthful bidding and efficiency while the discriminatory price and the generalized second-price auctions are superior in terms of revenue generation.
Citações
"In this paper we examine the knapsack problem with private information by investigating three practical auctions as possible candidates for payment rules in a setup where the knapsack owner sells space to object owners via an auction."
"Our results suggest that the uniform-price auction has the highest level of truthful bidding and efficiency while discriminatory price and generalized second-price auctions are superior in terms of revenue generation."