The paper experimentally evaluates four mechanisms designed to achieve the Uniform outcome in rationing problems:
Direct Revelation Uniform Rationing (DRU): Agents simultaneously report their types, and the Uniform allocation is assigned based on the reports.
Sequential Revelation Uniform Rationing (SRU): Agents report their types sequentially, with the second agent observing the first agent's report.
Obviously Strategy-proof Uniform Rationing (OSPU): A clock-auction type procedure where agents make a series of choices between their current temporary assignment and slightly modified assignments.
Pre-play Feedback Uniform Rationing (PFU): Identical to DRU, but agents can adjust their reports over a reporting period and are informed about their tentative assignments under the currently selected reports.
The key findings are:
PFU greatly improves performance compared to the other mechanisms, achieving the highest rates of Uniform outcomes, efficient allocations, and share of efficient outcome earnings.
SRU modestly improves performance compared to DRU, especially in cases where the Uniform allocation differs from equal division.
Contrary to expectations, the additional simplicity of OSPU does not improve performance compared to DRU.
The authors characterize the behavior in the different mechanisms to understand the reasons behind this ranking. Subjects in DRU often achieve the Uniform outcome through non-dominant strategies, resembling weakly-dominated Nash equilibria. The informational advantages of SRU2 and the feedback in PFU lead to higher rates of dominant strategy play and Uniform outcomes. The potential shortcomings of the OSPU mechanism, such as the existence of multiple nodes per player and the prevention of weakly-dominated Nash equilibria that achieve the Uniform outcome, lower its performance relative to DRU.
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by Alexander L.... kl. arxiv.org 04-19-2024
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2404.11883.pdfDybere Forespørgsler