Evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS) in asymmetric games, where players have different roles, can be defined in various ways. The dynamical stability of these ESS definitions under the replicator equation is analyzed, and connections between game theory, dynamical systems, and information theory are established.
The optimal "de-biasing" procedure for a survey designer to estimate the true public reception of a product, given strategic and boundedly-rational respondents with varying levels of information and cognitive hierarchy.
The Adaptation Procedure models iterative interactions in misinformation games, where players update their subjective views of the game based on the actual payoffs received, leading to a refinement of the natural misinformed equilibrium called the stable misinformed equilibrium.
Privacy can arise naturally as an equilibrium strategy in price discrimination games between buyers and a seller, even without explicit privacy mechanisms.
It is possible to achieve an extremely high Elo rating by rigging a large number of games, with the maximum rating depending on the number of players and games.
The core message of this paper is to study the effect of information asymmetry on resource allocation in General Lotto games, where one player (Blue) can gain information about the other player's (Red) resource allocation with a certain probability.
Incentives and rewards can be designed to achieve desirable equilibria in concurrent games with temporal logic constraints.
RL-CFR introduces a novel approach for dynamic action abstraction in Imperfect Information Extensive-Form Games (IIEFGs) using reinforcement learning.
PSRO is a game-theoretic framework that combines equilibrium computation with learning, providing a versatile approach for large-scale games.
Efficient algorithm for follower-agnostic learning in Stackelberg games.