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Improving Device-Independent Weak Coin Flipping Protocols


Kernkonzepte
The authors present two techniques, self-testing and abort-phobic compositions, to lower the bias of device-independent weak coin flipping protocols. They apply these techniques to an existing protocol and, assuming certain continuity conjectures, achieve a bias of approximately 0.29104.
Zusammenfassung

The authors study the cryptographic task of weak coin flipping, where Alice and Bob remotely flip a coin but want opposite outcomes, in the device-independent regime where they do not trust each other or their quantum devices.

The authors first introduce two new protocols, Protocol P and Protocol Q, which build on an existing protocol (Protocol S) by incorporating a self-testing step. In Protocol P, Alice self-tests Bob's devices, while in Protocol Q, Bob self-tests Alice's devices. This self-testing step allows the authors to bound the cheating probabilities of the dishonest party.

The authors then introduce a new composition technique called "abort-phobic composition", which takes into account the possibility of a party aborting the protocol upon detecting cheating by the other party. This composition technique further improves the security of the protocols.

By applying the self-testing and abort-phobic composition techniques, the authors are able to achieve a bias of approximately 0.29104 for their device-independent weak coin flipping protocols, assuming certain continuity conjectures hold.

The authors also discuss the broader applications of their techniques, such as improving the security of device-independent strong coin flipping protocols.

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by Atul Singh A... um arxiv.org 04-29-2024

https://arxiv.org/pdf/2404.17079.pdf
Improving device-independent weak coin flipping protocols

Tiefere Fragen

How can the continuity conjectures assumed in this work be formally proven

The continuity conjectures assumed in this work can be formally proven by conducting a rigorous mathematical analysis. Here are the steps that can be taken to prove these conjectures: Formalization of the Conjectures: The first step would be to precisely define the continuity conjectures in mathematical terms. This involves clearly stating the assumptions and the expected outcomes in a formal language. Mathematical Modeling: The next step would involve creating mathematical models that represent the scenarios described in the conjectures. This would include defining the variables, constraints, and objectives involved in the conjectures. Proof by Contradiction: One common approach to proving conjectures in mathematics is through proof by contradiction. Assume the conjecture is false and then demonstrate that this assumption leads to a logical inconsistency or contradiction. Analytical Techniques: Various analytical techniques such as linear programming, semi-definite programming, and optimization methods can be employed to analyze the conjectures and derive the desired results. Numerical Simulations: In some cases, numerical simulations and computational methods can be used to test the conjectures and verify their validity under different scenarios. Peer Review: Once the conjectures have been formally proven, it is essential to subject the proofs to peer review by experts in the field to ensure their accuracy and validity. By following these steps and utilizing mathematical tools and techniques, the continuity conjectures assumed in the work can be formally proven.

What other cryptographic tasks, beyond coin flipping, could benefit from the self-testing and abort-phobic composition techniques introduced in this work

The self-testing and abort-phobic composition techniques introduced in this work for weak coin flipping protocols can be applied to various other cryptographic tasks beyond coin flipping. Some of the cryptographic tasks that could benefit from these techniques include: Bit Commitment: Bit commitment protocols could benefit from self-testing techniques to ensure the integrity and security of the commitment process between parties. Oblivious Transfer: Self-testing can be used to verify the correctness and honesty of the parties involved in an oblivious transfer protocol, enhancing the overall security of the transaction. Quantum Key Distribution: Self-testing can play a crucial role in verifying the quantum key distribution process, ensuring that the shared keys are generated securely and without tampering. Secure Multi-Party Computation: The self-testing techniques can be applied to secure multi-party computation protocols to guarantee the trustworthiness of the involved parties and their computations. Random Number Generation: Self-testing can be used to validate the randomness of generated numbers in cryptographic applications, ensuring unpredictability and security. By incorporating self-testing and abort-phobic composition techniques into these cryptographic tasks, the overall security and reliability of the protocols can be enhanced.

Are there any fundamental limitations to the improvements in bias that can be achieved for device-independent weak coin flipping protocols, or is there potential for further reductions in bias

While the improvements in bias achieved for device-independent weak coin flipping protocols through self-testing and abort-phobic composition techniques are significant, there may be fundamental limitations to how much further bias reduction can be achieved. Some potential limitations include: Physical Constraints: The inherent limitations of quantum mechanics and the physical implementation of quantum protocols may impose restrictions on how much bias reduction can be realistically achieved. Information Leakage: The presence of information leakage or side-channel attacks in the protocols could limit the extent to which bias reduction can be improved without compromising security. Complexity of Protocols: As the protocols become more complex and involve multiple rounds of interactions, the potential for bias reduction may diminish due to increased vulnerabilities and attack surfaces. Quantum Uncertainty: The uncertainty and probabilistic nature of quantum systems may introduce limitations on the achievable bias reduction, especially in scenarios where perfect predictability is not feasible. While there may be some limitations to further reducing bias in device-independent weak coin flipping protocols, ongoing research and advancements in quantum cryptography may lead to innovative solutions and techniques that could potentially overcome these limitations and achieve even lower biases in the future.
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