From Design to Disclosure: Equivalence of Information Design and Voluntary Disclosure in Sender-Receiver Games
In strategic interactions where the sender doesn't benefit from full disclosure, voluntary disclosure can achieve virtually the same payoffs as information design, suggesting an equivalence between the two.
On the Equivalence of Synchronous and Asynchronous Coordination Mechanisms in Dynamic Games with Strategic Complementarities
Under certain conditions, achieving efficient coordination in dynamic games with strategic complementarities is possible regardless of whether decisions are made synchronously or asynchronously.
Strategic Communication Under Model Uncertainty: How Effectively Can Narrators Persuade Skeptical Receivers?
In strategic communication, where senders have incentives to manipulate information, skeptical receivers who are aware of these incentives limit the sender's persuasive power, but surprisingly, this skepticism may not always be in the receiver's best interest.
The Equilibrium Properties of Obvious Strategy Profiles in Games with Many Players: When Individual Strategies Align with Idealized Outcomes
In games with many players, individuals can achieve near-optimal outcomes by adopting "obvious strategies" – those aligned with the equilibrium of an idealized, simplified version of the game, even without explicit coordination.
커뮤니케이션에서 약속과 무작위성의 가치: 언제 약속이 발신자에게 유익한가?
유한한 행동과 상태를 가진 커뮤니케이션 게임에서 발신자에게 약속이 가치 있는 경우는 발신자가 무작위 전략을 선호하는 경우뿐이며, 이는 베이지안 설득 문제에서 부분적 실험이 아닌 무작위 실험이 최적일 때 발생한다.
Characterizing the Top Trading Cycles Rule in Housing Markets with Lexicographic Preferences and Limited Externalities
In housing markets where agents have lexicographic preferences, prioritizing either the house they receive or the recipient of their endowment, the Top Trading Cycles (TTC) rule is the only mechanism that guarantees individual rationality, pair efficiency, and strategy-proofness.
유한 표본에서의 할당량 메커니즘: 최적성 및 강건성 분석
유한한 의사결정 상황에서 할당량 메커니즘은 정보 비대칭 문제를 해결하는 데 효과적이며, 특히 의사결정 오류에 대한 명확한 한계를 제시하고, 다른 메커니즘에 비해 강건성을 지니고 있음을 보여줍니다.
ロバストなロバスト性：曖昧性集合外の事前分布に対するペイオフ保証の安定性
メカニズムデザインにおいて、従来のマキシミンアプローチは、曖昧性集合内の最悪ケースの期待ペイオフを保証するメカニズムを最適としていましたが、本稿では、曖昧性集合外の近傍にある事前分布に対してもペイオフ保証が大きく変動しない「ロバストなロバスト性」の概念を提唱しています。
Obvious Doctor Manipulations in Matching Markets with and without Contracts
While stable-dominating mechanisms are not obviously manipulable in matching markets without contracts, the introduction of contracts makes mechanisms like HDAM and EADAM vulnerable to very obvious manipulations by doctors.
Stackelberg vs. Nash Equilibria in the Lottery Colonel Blotto Game: Analyzing the Impact of Sequential Decision-Making
In resource allocation competitions modeled as Lottery Colonel Blotto games, a Stackelberg model, where one player acts as a leader and commits to a strategy before the follower responds, offers a strategic advantage compared to simultaneous decision-making in a Nash equilibrium.
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