Core Concepts
The Cut-and-Play algorithm computes Nash equilibria in simultaneous non-cooperative games where players decide via nonconvex and possibly unbounded optimization problems with separable payoff functions.
Abstract
The paper introduces the Cut-and-Play (CnP) algorithm, a practically-efficient method for computing equilibria in non-cooperative games where players solve nonconvex optimization problems. The key ideas are:
The authors prove that when the player's objective functions are separable, the game admits an equivalent convex representation, even if the players' feasible sets are inherently nonconvex. This allows them to exploit a sequence of polyhedral convexifications of the original nonconvex game.
CnP blends concepts such as relaxation (approximation), cutting planes, branching, and complementarity problems to find an exact Nash equilibrium (up to a machine epsilon) or prove its non-existence. It does not require the players' optimization problems to be convex or continuous, and can handle unbounded strategy sets.
The authors present computational results on two families of challenging nonconvex games: Integer Programming Games and Nash games among Stackelberg Players. CnP outperforms existing game-specific algorithms in terms of computing times and social welfare.
Stats
The game is formulated as a Separable-Payoff Game (SPG), where each player i solves a minimization problem of the form:
min_{x_i} {f^i(x_i; x_{-i}) := c_i^T x_i + sum_{j=1}^{m_i} g_j^i(x_{-i}) x_i_j}
subject to x_i in X_i.
Quotes
"We introduce Cut-and-Play, a practically-efficient algorithm for computing Nash equilibria in simultaneous non-cooperative games where players decide via nonconvex and possibly unbounded optimization problems with separable payoff functions."
"CnP overcomes some well-known algorithmic limitations. Specifically, our algorithm does not: (a.) require that the players' optimization problems are convex or continuous (b.) compute only pure (i.e., deterministic) equilibria (c.) rely on alternative or weaker concepts of equilibria."