Core Concepts
Existing bootstrapping protocols for Proof-of-Stake (PoS) blockchains are prone to centralization, and a game-theoretic analysis is needed to design an ideal bootstrapping protocol that ensures decentralization.
Abstract
The paper presents a game-theoretic analysis of bootstrapping protocols in Proof-of-Stake (PoS) blockchains. It argues that existing bootstrapping protocols, such as Airdrop and Proof-of-Burn, are prone to centralization.
The authors introduce a game Γbootstrap to model the bootstrapping process and define three key properties an ideal bootstrapping protocol should satisfy: Individual Rationality (IR), Incentive Compatibility (IC), and Decentralization (DC).
To quantify centralization, the authors propose a novel metric called C-NORM, which captures the strategic behavior of players, including Sybil attacks. They also introduce a centralization game Γcent to evaluate the effectiveness of centralization metrics. The authors show that C-NORM is effective in detecting centralization, unlike other existing metrics.
The paper then analyzes popular bootstrapping protocols. It proves that Airdrop is not IC and Proof-of-Burn is not IR. In contrast, the authors show that a Proof-of-Work (PoW) based bootstrapping protocol, called W2SB, is ideal as it satisfies IR, IC, and DC. The authors validate their findings through synthetic simulations.
Stats
The total reward for player 𝑝𝑖 is proportional to the stake allocated to it, which in turn is proportional to its reported valuation ˆ
𝜃𝑖.
The cost of centralization depends on 𝑔(𝜃𝑖), which is a non-decreasing function of 𝜃𝑖 for player 𝑝𝑖.
Quotes
"Centralization in PoS-based blockchains, such as the Polygon Hard fork and popular PoS-based blockchains like ICON, Tezos, Cosmos, and Irisnet, exposes them to the risk of potential attacks."
"Governance and security of blockchains rely on the decentralization of resources among players. If a player/coalition collects disproportionate rewards, it might compromise the correctness of protocols."