Core Concepts
This work provides theoretical insights for a recently proposed learning paradigm, Nash learning from human feedback (NLHF), which considers a general preference model and formulates the alignment process as a game between two competitive LLMs. The learning objective is to find a policy that consistently generates responses preferred over any competing policy while staying close to the initial model.
Abstract
The paper presents a theoretical analysis of the Nash learning from human feedback (NLHF) framework, which considers a general preference model and formulates the alignment process as a game between two competitive large language models (LLMs).
Key highlights:
The authors aim to make the first attempt to study the theoretical learnability of the KL-regularized NLHF by considering both offline and online settings.
For the offline learning from a pre-collected dataset, the authors propose two algorithms based on the principle of pessimism, which achieve finite-sample guarantees under suitable coverage conditions.
For batch online learning from iterative interactions with a preference oracle, the authors propose a sample-efficient algorithm that enjoys a finite-sample guarantee under the structural condition of the underlying preference model.
The results connect the new NLHF paradigm with traditional reinforcement learning theory and validate the potential of reward-model-free learning under general preference.
Stats
The paper does not contain any explicit numerical data or metrics. It focuses on the theoretical analysis of the NLHF framework.