Core Concepts
The author explores optimal contract design for search problems using the Pandora's Box model, focusing on maximizing expected rewards while aligning incentives between principal and agent.
Abstract
The content delves into contract design optimization for search problems using the Pandora's Box model. It discusses scenarios, linear contracts, general contracts, and various subclasses within the context of principal-agent settings. The analysis provides insights into computing optimal contracts efficiently.
The study examines scenarios where a decision maker delegates exploration tasks to an agent, emphasizing the importance of aligning incentives through contracts. It highlights the complexities involved in designing optimal contracts for different problem settings. The research contributes to understanding algorithmic contract design in real-world applications.
Key points include exploring linear and general contracts, addressing scenarios with no intrinsic agent value, binary boxes, and i.i.d. cases with a single positive prize for the principal. The analysis showcases how fair caps and payments are crucial in determining optimal solutions for contract design.
Overall, the content offers a comprehensive examination of contract design optimization strategies within the Pandora's Box model framework.
Stats
Optimal solution proposed by Weitzman [36]
Linear contracts computed in polynomial time
General contracts considered with non-zero agent values
Quotes
"We show how to compute optimal linear contracts in polynomial time."
"A suitable adaptation of the index policy results in an optimal contract."