The article delves into the concept of Almost-Bayesian Quadratic Persuasion, challenging traditional Bayesian models. It introduces the idea of Alice assuming Bob behaves 'almost like' a Bayesian agent without specific modeling. The study reveals that linear policies may not always be optimal under this assumption. By considering Bob's non-Bayesian behavior, the authors derive bounds for near-optimal linear policies numerically. The analysis shows that as Bob deviates from Bayesianity, Alice shares less information with detrimental effects on Bob.
The content discusses strategic information transmission problems and their relevance in decision-making, control, and computer science domains. It reviews the canonical model of Bayesian Persuasion by Kamenica & Gentzkow and introduces an extended version considering non-Bayesian behaviors. The focus is on communication networks and uncertain systems within game theory contexts.
The study presents a solvable example of linear-quadratic communication problems where the receiver is not exactly Bayesian. It explores various scenarios where Bob's behavior deviates from perfect Bayesianism due to errors or lack of access to correct prior information. The authors propose an ellipsoidal hypothesis to model lack of Bayesianity in persuasion problems.
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