Core Concepts
The author explores the concept of equilibrium design in concurrent games, focusing on designing incentives to achieve desirable equilibria that satisfy specific temporal logic properties.
Abstract
The content delves into mechanism design and equilibrium design in game theory, emphasizing the use of rewards to influence player behavior. It discusses the complexities of achieving desired outcomes in concurrent games and presents algorithms for solving these problems efficiently.
The paper introduces the concept of Nash equilibrium and explores how modifying payoffs can lead to more favorable outcomes. It highlights the importance of incentive schemes and their impact on player strategies. The discussion extends to social welfare measures and computational complexity analysis.
Overall, the content provides a comprehensive overview of equilibrium design in concurrent games, shedding light on key concepts such as Nash equilibrium, reward schemes, and strategic decision-making.
Stats
We consider system specifications given by LTL and GR(1) formulae.
Designing incentives ensures that a given temporal logic property is satisfied on some/every Nash equilibrium.
Equilibrium design can be used as an alternative solution to rational synthesis problems for concurrent games.
The complexities of related decision problems lie within the polynomial hierarchy.
Equilibrium design aims to repair undesirable Nash equilibria optimally.