The paper introduces a methodology to prevent microarchitectural timing side channels in security-critical applications through data-oblivious programming. It discusses formal verification techniques and case studies on open-source designs, highlighting the importance of constant-time programming for hardware security.
The methodology involves systematically partitioning input/output signals, iterative refinement of properties, and verifying data-obliviousness at the microarchitectural level. Various optimizations like unrolled proofs and black-boxing are discussed to enhance scalability and efficiency in formal verification processes.
Key points include the significance of preventing timing side channels, proposing a novel verification methodology, demonstrating feasibility through case studies, and discussing optimizations for efficient verification processes.
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by Lucas Deutsc... at arxiv.org 03-12-2024
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2308.07757.pdfDeeper Inquiries