Core Concepts
The Logic of Ordinary Discourse (OL) is a three-valued propositional logic that challenges classical logic by rejecting some theses and accepting non-classically valid principles. The authors present modular and analytic Hilbert-style multiple-conclusion and single-conclusion axiomatizations for OL and its structural companion sOL, and investigate their algebraic semantics.
Abstract
The content discusses the Logic of Ordinary Discourse (OL), a three-valued propositional logic proposed by W.S. Cooper as a more adequate formalization of everyday reasoning in natural language. The key highlights are:
OL is a notable exception among non-classical logics, as it is not subclassical - it accepts non-classically valid principles such as Aristotle's and Boethius' theses, while rejecting some classical tautologies.
The authors present modular and analytic Hilbert-style multiple-conclusion and single-conclusion axiomatizations for OL and its structural companion sOL. The calculi are obtained via the methods developed in Shoesmith and Smiley [1978] and Caleiro and Marcelino [2019].
The authors prove that sOL is algebraizable, with the quasi-variety OL as its equivalent semantics. OL turns out to be a discriminator variety, making sOL a nearly functionally complete logic.
It is shown that sOL is definitionally equivalent to an expansion of Da Costa and D'Ottaviano's three-valued logic J3, which is an axiomatic extension of paraconsistent Nelson logic.
The authors discuss potential future developments, including a more extensive study of the algebraic counterpart of sOL and the extension of the present approach to other logics definable from the truth tables of OL.