Core Concepts
One-sided cardinal-utility matching markets face challenges in achieving envy-freeness and Pareto-optimality efficiently.
Abstract
The content discusses the complexities of achieving envy-freeness and Pareto-optimality in cardinal-utility matching markets. It explores the challenges faced in finding efficient mechanisms for these markets, focusing on both one-sided and two-sided scenarios. The paper presents results on the PPAD-hardness of computing EF+PO lotteries, the Nash bargaining approach for efficiency, and the existence of rational JEF + weak PO allocations. Various algorithms and mechanisms are discussed to address these challenges.
Introduction:
Comparison between ordinal and cardinal utility matching markets.
One-Sided Matching Markets:
Challenges in assigning indivisible goods fairly.
Importance of probability distributions in matching markets.
Hylland-Zeckhauser Mechanism:
Pricing-based approach for envy-free and Pareto-optimal allocations.
PPAD-Hardness:
Complexity of finding EF+PO allocations in one-sided markets.
Nash Bargaining:
Efficient mechanism for achieving approximate envy-freeness and incentive compatibility.
Two-Sided Matching Markets:
Considerations for bipartite and non-bipartite scenarios with symmetric utilities.
Rationality:
Existence of rational EF+PO allocations in matching markets.
Stats
HZメカニズムは、(ex-ante)エンヴィーフリー(EF)であり、ペアレト最適(PO)である。
PPAD完全な1辺の基数効用マッチング市場のEF+PO抽選を見つける問題はPPAD完全である。
ナッシュ交渉に基づく機構は、2-envy-freeおよび2-incentive compatibleである。