Core Concepts
Load altering attacks can significantly impact the voltage profile of distribution systems, and the severity of the impact depends on the underlying load model and the location of the attack.
Abstract
The paper examines the detrimental impact of load altering attacks (LAAs) on the voltage profile of distribution systems, considering the realistic ZIP (constant impedance, constant current, constant power) load model. The authors derive closed-form expressions to compute the voltages of buses following an LAA and characterize the minimum number of devices that need to be compromised to cause voltage safety violations.
Key highlights:
The authors consider the ZIP load model, which represents the voltage-dependency of real-world loads, in contrast to the commonly used constant power (CP) load model.
They introduce two approximations - the linearized distribution flow (LinDistFlow) model and the ZP approximation for the ZIP load model - to obtain analytically tractable expressions for computing the bus voltages.
The analysis shows that the location of the LAA is a critical factor, with attacks on leaf buses having a more severe impact on the voltage profile.
Comparing the CP and ZIP load models, the authors find that the voltage dependency of loads helps alleviate the negative effects of LAAs to some extent.
The closed-form approximations are used to determine the minimum number of devices that need to be compromised to cause voltage constraint violations, which is lower for attacks on leaf buses.
The summary provides a comprehensive understanding of the paper's key findings and the analytical insights obtained through the proposed approximations.
Stats
P A
a = (Uth - 1 + 2∆k) / (-2(rk,a + QD/PD xk,a))
P AZIP
a = P A
a (αpa + βpaVa + γpaV^2
a)
QAZIP
a = QA
a (αqa + βqaVa + γqaV^2
a)
Quotes
"Load-altering attacks (LAAs) pose a significant threat to power systems with Internet of Things (IoT)-controllable load devices."
"Taking the voltage dependency of load demand into account by implementing the ZIP load model in our analysis."
"Deriving closed-form expressions to calculate the voltage of buses following an LAA and characterizing the minimum number of devices to be compromised in order to cause voltage safety violations in the distribution system."