The article presents a framework for designing optimal incentives to encourage prosumers to provide grid services during abnormal events in distribution networks. The key highlights are:
The distribution grid is modeled with prosumers who can both consume and generate power. Prosumers are subject to a net energy metering (NEM 1.0) tariff design, where they incur a linear affine cost for their net power injection.
During contingencies, the system operator (SO) can offer incentives to prosumers to change their power demand and support grid operations. The incentives are modeled as a linear function that shapes the prosumer surplus, essentially altering the energy price.
The SO aims to design the optimal incentive functions that promote satisfaction of operational constraints, such as voltage limits and power exchange limits, while minimizing the cost of sustaining the grid.
The authors propose feedback-based optimization algorithms to iteratively update the incentive parameters, even when the SO does not have full information about the grid state and prosumer preferences.
Numerical simulations on the IEEE 33-bus test feeder validate the proposed incentive mechanism and the feedback control approaches, demonstrating their effectiveness in maintaining grid stability during contingencies.
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by Guido Cavrar... at arxiv.org 03-29-2024
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2403.19616.pdfDeeper Inquiries