Core Concepts
Voting mechanisms are susceptible to external information that can skew voter preferences, affecting the probability of alternatives being selected and overall social welfare. This work analyzes the impact of such anchoring information on voting outcomes.
Abstract
The content examines how external information, referred to as "anchoring information", can influence voting outcomes and social welfare. It introduces an intermediate mechanism to analyze the effects of anchoring information without requiring full elicitation of cardinal voter preferences.
Key highlights:
- Derives bounds on the probability that a given alternative is selected by different voting rules, and shows these bounds can tighten or loosen when voters have anchored preferences.
- Demonstrates that when the anchoring information aligns with the true social preferences, the expected social welfare increases.
- Provides an upper bound on the probability that social welfare decreases under anchored preferences.
- Introduces an intermediary mechanism that simulates the effect of anchoring information without requiring full cardinal preference elicitation.
The analysis shows that anchoring information can significantly impact voting outcomes, both in terms of the probability of alternatives being selected and the overall social welfare. The results highlight the importance of understanding and accounting for such informational externalities in the design and analysis of voting mechanisms.
Stats
The content does not provide any specific numerical data or metrics to support the key arguments. It focuses on theoretical analysis and derivation of bounds.
Quotes
The content does not contain any direct quotes that are particularly striking or support the key arguments.