
Aggregating informed majority decisions in voting becomes impossible when voters have antagonistic preferences contingent on an unknown world state and can form coalitions, especially when the proportion of majority and minority types are close.


coremsg

when-is-the-aggregation-of-antagonistic-contingent-preferences-possible-


When Is the Aggregation of Antagonistic Contingent Preferences Possible?


title_rewrite


Iterative voting's average-case analysis reveals insights into social welfare improvements.


iterative-voting-average-case-analysis-and-economic-performance


Iterative Voting: Average-Case Analysis and Economic Performance



The authors analyze the economic performance of iterative voting in social choice decision-making, focusing on average-case scenarios and a wider class of preference distributions.


analyzing-iterative-voting-for-social-choice-decision-making


Analyzing Iterative Voting for Social Choice Decision-Making
