核心概念
Fair allocation under ternary valuations is APX-hard for both Nash and egalitarian welfare objectives.
要約
The content discusses the complexity of fair allocation under ternary valuations with distinct values a, b, and c. It explores the challenges of maximizing Nash and egalitarian welfare, showing APX-hardness for both objectives. The analysis includes reductions from graph theory problems and comparisons with previous results.
Abstract
- Fair allocation of indivisible items with ternary valuations is studied.
- Max Nash welfare (MNW) and max egalitarian welfare (MEW) are considered.
Introduction
- Fair allocation is a fundamental issue in computational economics.
- Challenges arise when agents have arbitrary valuations.
Results
- APX-hardness is shown for maximizing Nash welfare under ternary valuations.
- Complexity analysis for maximizing egalitarian welfare is provided.
Additional Work
- Approximation algorithms and APX-hardness in related studies are discussed.
Preliminaries
- Definitions and assumptions for the fair allocation problem.
The All Goods Case: 0 ≤ a < b < c
- Complexity analysis for MNW allocation under specific valuations.
Further Complexity Analysis
- Resolution of APX-hardness for MNW allocation under different valuation scenarios.
Conclusion
- The impossibility of approximating MNW under specific valuations is highlighted.
統計
For any distinct a, b, and c, maximizing Nash welfare is APX-hard.
For any distinct a, b, and c, maximizing egalitarian welfare is APX-hard.
引用
"Recent works study simpler classes of valuations where exact fair allocations can be computed."
"Fair allocation of indivisible items is a fundamental problem in computational economics."