核心概念
By reformulating a given dynamic Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control (CACC) scheme, a class of equivalent controller realizations can be derived that exhibit the same platooning behavior with varying robustness against False Data Injection (FDI) attacks.
要約
The paper introduces a controller-oriented approach to enhance the robustness of cooperative driving to cyberattacks. It is shown that by reformulating a given dynamic CACC scheme, a class of equivalent controller realizations exists, having equivalent nominal behavior with varying robustness in the presence of FDI attacks.
The key highlights are:
- The base CACC controller can be represented by a class of new but equivalent controllers (base controller realizations) that exhibit the same platooning behavior with varying robustness against attacks.
- A prescriptive synthesis framework is proposed where the base controller and the system dynamics are written in new coordinates via an invertible coordinate transformation on the controller state. This does not affect the input-output behavior, but each realization may require a different combination of sensors.
- An optimization problem is formulated to obtain the optimal combination of sensors that minimizes the effect of FDI attacks by solving a Linear Matrix Inequality (LMI), while quantifying the attack impact through reachability analysis.
- Simulation studies demonstrate that this approach enhances the robustness of cooperative driving, without relying on a detection scheme and maintaining all system properties.
統計
The paper does not contain any explicit numerical data or statistics. The focus is on the theoretical development of the controller realization framework and the optimization problem.
引用
The paper does not contain any direct quotes that are particularly striking or support the key logics.