核心概念
Auction-managed AMM optimizes revenue and reduces losses for liquidity providers.
要約
The paper introduces the auction-managed AMM, addressing issues of minimizing losses to arbitrageurs and maximizing fee revenue. It presents a mechanism where a censorship-resistant auction determines the pool manager, who sets swap fees and captures arbitrage opportunities. Liquidity providers can freely enter and exit the pool, paying a small withdrawal fee. The AMM aims to attract more liquidity than fixed-fee AMMs in equilibrium.
Introduction:
AMMs face challenges of minimizing losses to arbitrageurs and optimizing fee revenue.
The auction-managed AMM targets both issues with a single mechanism.
Auction Design:
The auction sets up a two-stage game for potential managers and liquidity providers.
A Harberger lease auction determines the pool manager who can adjust swap fees.
Theory:
The model considers a constant product AMM with noise traders and arbitrageurs.
Equilibrium analysis shows that the am-AMM attracts more liquidity than fixed-fee AMMs.
Discussion:
The AMM shifts the burden of fee optimization to the pool manager.
Drawbacks include vulnerability to sandwich attacks and centralization risks.
統計
"A withdrawal fee of 1 - 2·√fcap/fcap+1 is sufficient to protect managers from strategic liquidity withdrawals."
"The arb excess expression in (3) is σ2/8 * exp(-f/σ√(Δt/2)) * e^f/2 * (1 - σ^2Δt/8)."
引用
"The am-AMM will attract more liquidity than any fixed-fee AMM in equilibrium."