The paper evaluates the effectiveness of radio fingerprinting techniques for satellite communication systems under interference and jamming attacks. It focuses on the Iridium satellite constellation and collects a dataset of 540,066 Iridium messages with varying levels of Gaussian noise added to the incoming signal. The authors also generate additional datasets by adding synthetic jamming to clean signals in software.
The results show that in order to disrupt the transmitter fingerprint through jamming, a similar or greater transmit power is required than to disrupt the message contents via traditional jamming techniques. The difference in required attacker power is within 2.5 dB. The authors conclude that the use of fingerprinting to authenticate satellite communication does not significantly weaken the system against jamming attacks.
The authors discuss potential reasons for this, including the fact that fingerprinting in the satellite context is more robust to noise due to the high levels of atmospheric distortion, and the fingerprinter operating on a different part of the signal than the decoder. They also note that an attacker using more targeted adversarial machine learning techniques may be able to disrupt the fingerprinter more effectively, but this is left for future work.
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