핵심 개념
Incentivizing participation in clinical trials through information asymmetry and exploration-exploitation tradeoff.
초록
The article discusses the challenges of recruiting patients for clinical trials and proposes a mechanism to incentivize participation. It frames the issue as a tradeoff between exploration and exploitation, leveraging information asymmetry. The statistical performance is measured through worst-case estimation error. The article extends the results to heterogeneous agents and emphasizes the importance of non-standard exploration-exploitation tradeoffs in clinical trials.
The content is structured as follows:
- Introduction to Clinical Trials
- Issue of Patient Recruitment
- Exploration-Exploitation Tradeoff
- Incentivizing Participation Mechanism
- Economic Theory Assumptions
- Model for Incentivized Participation
- Results and Guarantees
- Discussion on Significance
- Map of the Paper
통계
"We obtain a near-optimal solution in terms of this objective: an incentive-compatible mechanism with a particular guarantee."
"Our results extend to heterogeneous agents."
"The mechanism’s statistical objective is standard for clinical trials: counterfactually estimate each arm’s performance on the whole population, even if the outcomes are generated by an adversary."
인용구
"In more abstract terms, we have a non-standard variant of exploration-exploitation tradeoff: the clinical trial would like to explore as uniformly as possible, whereas each patient prefers the trial to exploit, and might not participate otherwise."
"Our objective is to incentivize participation while optimizing statistical performance."