Analyzing the Interconnected Ecosystem of Common Criteria Certified Products: Identifying High-Impact Dependencies and Aging Risks

Belangrijkste concepten

The Common Criteria certification ecosystem features a complex network of interconnected certified products, with many products relying on the security functions of other certified devices. This study analyzes the prevalence and nature of these dependencies, identifying high-reach products that could significantly impact the broader ecosystem if compromised, and examining the risks posed by references to archived products.

Samenvatting

The researchers conducted a comprehensive analysis of the references among Common Criteria (CC) certified products to understand the dependency relationships within this ecosystem. They developed a method to construct a reference graph, where the vertices represent certified products and the edges indicate references between them. The edges were further annotated with the context of the references, such as component reuse or predecessor relationships, using a supervised machine learning approach.

The key findings of the study are:

1. Referencing culture:

   • The primary reasons for cross-referencing among CC certificates are component reuse and references to predecessor products.
   • Smartcard products heavily favor component reuse, with the majority depending on at least one other certified product.
   • The reach of an average smartcard has incrementally increased to approximately 2 other products, around which it currently stabilizes.
   • Products from other categories remain largely isolated, with limited referencing.

2. High-reach certified products:

   • Just a dozen smartcard devices influence more than 10% of the whole CC ecosystem at any given time.
   • These high-reach devices are typically integrated circuits or microcontrollers implementing critical cryptographic functionality, often evaluated to high assurance levels (EAL5+).
   • Our analysis showed that critical flaws in these high-reach devices would likely spread to many other products, crippling the broader surrounding.

3. Aging of referenced products:

   • Referencing archived certificates is rare, with only 14 different products found to use components from archived certificates at the time of issuance.
   • However, the persistence of archived products with positive reach extends well beyond a year.
   • The Dutch certification scheme is the strictest towards old components in composite evaluations, while some other evaluation bodies certify products that include components nearing archival or already archived.

The researchers highlight the importance of these findings for security analysts, product designers, and certification authorities to make well-informed decisions about product dependencies and enforce robust security measures for prominent components with extensive reach.

Statistieken

The key metrics and figures used in the study include:

5394 total Common Criteria certified products
2712 references (edges) between the certified products
30.76% of the certified products have at least one reference
74.08% of smartcards reference some other product
61.78% of smartcards reference other certified products in a component-reuse relation
The top 10 transitively referenced products affect 23% of all valid smartcards as of November 2023
69% of the edges in the studied components were labeled as "component used", indicating a critical vulnerability in the high-reach product could spread dramatically

Citaten

"Just a dozen of smartcard devices influence more than 10% of the whole ecosystem at any given time."
"Our experiment showed that such high-reach devices are indeed used as components in nearly 70% of the products that reference them. As a consequence, critical flaws in these high-reach devices would likely spread to many other products, crippling the broader surrounding."
"We observed that the Dutch scheme is the strictest towards old components in composite evaluations. In contrast to this, some evaluation bodies certify products that include components nearing the archival or those already archived."

Belangrijkste Inzichten Gedestilleerd Uit

Chain of trust: Unraveling the references among Common Criteria certified products

by Adam... om arxiv.org 04-23-2024

https://arxiv.org/pdf/2404.14246.pdf

Diepere vragen

What are the potential implications of the observed referencing patterns on the overall security and resilience of the Common Criteria ecosystem

The observed referencing patterns in the Common Criteria ecosystem can have significant implications on its overall security and resilience. The extensive use of references, particularly in smartcards, indicates a complex network of dependencies among certified products. While this can enhance security through independent evaluation of sub-components and vulnerability tracking, it also introduces potential risks. High-reach devices, such as integrated circuits and microcontrollers, become prime targets for malicious actors due to their widespread influence. A vulnerability in one of these devices could propagate to numerous other products, leading to widespread security breaches. The interconnected nature of the ecosystem means that a single point of failure in a high-reach device could have cascading effects on the entire network of certified products.

How can certification authorities and product vendors work together to mitigate the risks posed by high-reach devices and references to archived products

Certification authorities and product vendors can collaborate to mitigate the risks posed by high-reach devices and references to archived products in the Common Criteria ecosystem. Firstly, certification authorities can enforce stricter guidelines on the evaluation and re-evaluation of products, especially those with high reach. Regular assessments and updates can help identify and address vulnerabilities in critical components before they are exploited. Vendors, on the other hand, should prioritize security in their product development process, ensuring that dependencies are carefully managed and vulnerabilities are promptly addressed. They should also maintain accurate documentation to reflect the current state of their products and avoid referencing archived components without proper justification. Collaboration between authorities and vendors can lead to a more secure and resilient certification ecosystem, with proactive measures in place to mitigate potential risks.

What other factors, beyond the referencing patterns, could influence the security and trustworthiness of the Common Criteria certified products

Beyond the referencing patterns, several other factors can influence the security and trustworthiness of Common Criteria certified products. One crucial factor is the quality of the evaluation process itself. The thoroughness and accuracy of the evaluation, conducted by accredited and independent security laboratories, directly impact the reliability of the certification. The level of assurance provided by the Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) also plays a significant role in determining the security posture of a certified product. Higher EALs indicate a more rigorous evaluation process and a higher level of security assurance. Additionally, the adherence to security best practices, the robustness of cryptographic implementations, and the timely patching of vulnerabilities are essential factors that contribute to the overall security and trustworthiness of certified products. Continuous monitoring, regular updates, and proactive security measures are essential to maintain the integrity of the Common Criteria ecosystem.