Belangrijkste concepten
The authors analyze how pricing affects surplus distribution among buyers in auctions for multiple units, proposing a metric for equity. They show that a mix of pay-as-bid and uniform pricing minimizes surplus variance, with log-concave signal distributions providing bounds on optimal pricing.
Samenvatting
The content delves into the impact of pricing rules on surplus distribution in multi-unit auctions. It introduces the concept of winners' empirical variance (WEV) as a metric for equity and explores the relationship between pricing formats and surplus distribution. The analysis considers log-concave signal distributions to provide insights into optimal auction pricing strategies.
The study highlights the importance of equitable pricing in auctions and its implications for competition and welfare considerations. It discusses various auction formats, their impact on efficiency and revenue, and the trade-offs involved. The research aims to contribute to the theoretical understanding of surplus considerations among buyers in auctions.
Key points include:
- Introduction to multi-unit auctions and their applications across different domains.
- Discussion on traditional auction pricing rules like pay-as-bid and uniform pricing.
- Importance of considering surplus distribution among buyers for market stability.
- Proposal of winners' empirical variance (WEV) as a metric for evaluating equity in auctions.
- Analysis of how private-common value mixes influence optimal auction pricing strategies.
- Examination of log-concave signal distributions to determine bounds on WEV-minimizing pricing.
Overall, the content provides valuable insights into equitable pricing strategies in auctions, emphasizing the need to consider surplus distribution among buyers beyond revenue considerations.
Statistieken
For a range of private-common-value mixes, a strictly interior mix of pay-as-bid and uniform pricing minimizes WEV.
Log-concave signal distributions provide bounds on WEV-minimizing auction prices.
Citaten
"We propose the winners’ empirical variance (WEV), the expected empirical variance of surplus among the winners, as a metric for surplus equity."
"Auctions with higher private value components benefit from more price discrimination."
"Surplus equity is influenced by common value proportions in item valuations."