This study explores the capabilities of large language models (LLMs) in detecting prevalent logical pitfalls and unwarranted beliefs, in comparison to the average human. The authors utilize established psychometric assessments, such as the Popular Epistemically Unwarranted Beliefs Inventory (PEUBI), to assess the performance of three LLMs - GPT-3.5, GPT-4, and Gemini.
The key highlights and insights from the study are:
LLMs consistently outperform the average human on the PEUBI benchmark, suggesting they may be less susceptible to unwarranted beliefs.
The authors propose the concept of "unstable rationality" to describe the LLMs' reasoning abilities, which are neither inherently intelligent nor fully rational, but rather a unique form of competence derived from their training.
Experiments with negation and language translation reveal inconsistencies in the LLMs' reasoning, indicating that their rationality is fragile and easily disrupted.
The authors explore the potential of using LLMs as personalized persuasion agents, leveraging theories of cognitive dissonance and elaboration likelihood, to challenge and potentially shift human beliefs.
The study highlights the need for caution and prudence when utilizing LLMs for such applications, as their rationality is not fully stable or reliable.
Overall, the research suggests that while LLMs may outperform humans in detecting unwarranted beliefs, their own reasoning abilities are not without limitations, and careful consideration is required when deploying them as misinformation debunking agents.
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by Sowmya S Sun... às arxiv.org 05-03-2024
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2405.00843.pdfPerguntas Mais Profundas