
In resource allocation competitions modeled as Lottery Colonel Blotto games,  a Stackelberg model, where one player acts as a leader and commits to a strategy before the follower responds, offers a strategic advantage compared to simultaneous decision-making in a Nash equilibrium.


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Stackelberg vs. Nash Equilibria in the Lottery Colonel Blotto Game: Analyzing the Impact of Sequential Decision-Making


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In repeated Stackelberg games where the follower learns the leader's strategy through observations, the leader must adopt inferable strategies, even if suboptimal in the full-information setting, to maximize long-term rewards.


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The Impact of Inferability on Optimal Leader Strategies in Repeated Stackelberg Games
